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Abstract Profit taxes are widely acknowledged to influence the location of firms’
headquarters. This paper sheds light on the role of aspects of labor taxation for the
international location of headquarters. While profit taxes can be avoided in various
ways, it is much harder for firms to manipulate the firm-specific labor tax base so
that labor taxes may be relatively important for firm location. We construct a unique
data set of effective labor taxes in 120 countries and use data on the location of
35,206 firms to analyze the impact of labor income tax rates, the progressivity of the
income tax schedule, and social security contributions on firms’ decisions where to
locate their headquarters. The findings suggest that both a higher progressivity of the
tax system and higher (employee- and employer-borne) social security contributions
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negatively influence a country’s attractiveness for headquarters location. Hence, a one
percentage point increase in these payroll taxes, reduces the probability of a country
to attract headquarters by 6.1 %. The results prove robust in various empirical model
specifications and subsets of the data.
Keywords Labor taxation · Headquarters · Location choice · Nested logit
JEL Classification H24 · C25
1 Introduction
The taxation of profits and capital as an impediment to the location (and ex-
tent) of investment received much attention in theoretical as well as empirical aca-
demic work in public finance (see, e.g., Devereux and Griffith 1998; Devereux and
Hubbard 2003). The focus on profit taxation flows from the assumption of capi-
tal to be relatively mobile across international borders, at least in comparison to
other production factors such as labor. Empirical work, however, points to three
issues suggesting that an emphasis on profit taxation may be insufficient: (i) cap-
ital and skilled workers have been conjectured and found to be largely comple-
mentary in production (see Griliches 1969; Duffy et al. 2004); (ii) skilled workers
and employees—such as managers, technicians, and researchers—are relatively mo-
bile across international borders (see Chiswick 1999; Liebig and Sousa-Poza 2004;
Grogger and Hanson 2008); and (iii) the profit tax base can easily be manipulated
(by transfer pricing, debt shifting, etc.)1 while this is much harder for the labor (or
income) tax base. Hence, income taxation may be relevant for headquarters location
to the extent that it affects the local availability of skilled workers (and their effort)
and even education choice of individuals in the long run.
There is anecdotal evidence that the (re)location of headquarters of large multi-
national firms in recent years has been codetermined by issues of profit and labor
taxation.2 Most of the theoretical and empirical literature on the location of firms
considers (employee- and employer-borne) income tax aspects only implicitly.3 If
1There is extensive evidence in the literature on the strategies and the extent to which multinational
enterprises engage in profit shifting activities (see, for instance, Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Weichen-
rieder 2009). This can be done for instance by manipulating transfer prices (see Hines and Rice 1994;
Clausing 2003), by intracompany loans (see, e.g., Mintz and Smart 2004; Büttner and Wamser 2007) or
by the relocation of intangible assets to low-tax affiliates (see, e.g., Dischinger and Riedel 2011).
2For example, this was mentioned with regard to the relocation of the European headquarters of Procter
and Gamble, McDonalds, and Kraft, from London to Switzerland (see Handelsblatt 2009).
3See Baldwin et al. (2003) for economic theory and Rathelot and Sillard (2008) for empirical analysis
on the location of mobile firms in general; Markusen (2002) for economic theory and Strauss-Kahn and
Vives (2009) for empirical analysis on the location of headquarters of multinational firms; Barba Navaretti
and Venables (2006) for economic theory and Head and Mayer (2004) as well as Becker et al. (2005) for
empirical analysis on the location of production units of multinational firms.
Defever (2006) focuses on the co-location of non-European firms’ value chain in the European Union
for the period 1997–2002 and finds that the location of service activities depends in particular on functional
aspects and that headquarters location does not seem to attract any other part of a firm’s value chain. Bel
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at all, previous work on firm location considered the role of profit taxation, but ab-
stained from explicitly shedding light on income taxation issues. The paper by Eg-
ger and Radulescu (2011) is an exception. It considers the effects of labor taxation
on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) in a cross section of 52 countries rather
than headquarters location as such. Their results suggest that bilateral outward FDI
is smaller the bigger the difference between host-to-parent country labor tax rates.
The roles played by the net wage, the income tax rate, and, more generally, the em-
ployee’s income tax burden, as opposed to the employer’s tax burden, in determining
firm locations are virtually unexplored.4
We argue that a higher employer-borne income tax burden on high-skilled labor
directly reduces a firm’s profits, as they represent a direct cost for the firm unless
the tax burden can be fully passed on to employees. A higher employee-borne in-
come tax burden exercises a negative effect on managerial effort (see Egger and
Radulescu 2011) and, hence, indirectly reduces a firm’s profits.5 Headquarters ser-
vices intensively use high-skilled labor, in particular (see Carr et al. 2001; Markusen
and Fageda (2008) employ firm-level and international flights data on major urban areas in 25 European
Union member countries. Their findings indicate that, among others, the proximity to large markets and
the supply of direct international flights influence the headquarters location choice positively. Davis and
Henderson (2008) use panel data on auxiliary establishments of firms in the United States and show that
a higher number of local service input providers and the scale of other headquarters activities nearby
stimulates the agglomeration of headquarters. Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) investigate the location of
headquarters for the United States over the years 1996 to 2001 and find that factors such as low average
wages, low corporate tax rates, and the agglomeration of other headquarters in the same sector influence
the relocation of headquarters positively.
4As said before, this may be problematic especially, with an interplay of capital-skill complementarity at
the headquarters level, the relative mobility of skilled workers, and the relative difficulty of avoiding labor
taxes (relative to profit taxes).
5In economic theory, a salient prediction states that the effective economic incidence of a tax is indepen-
dent of the statutory incidence of taxes. In our context, this implies that placing an income tax of the same
amount on employees versus employers will have identical effects on the real economy, unless there are
other distortions which cause asymmetric effects. This principle is referred to as “Invariance of Incidence
Proposition (IIP),” and, for labor taxation, it inter alia requires perfectly competitive labor markets (OECD
1990). In the presence of adjustment costs or imperfect labor markets, moving from taxing income at
the employer to taxing it at the employee may not be neutral. The labor market institutions and condi-
tions have thus an important influence on the effect of different labor taxes. In reality, nominal contractual
wages are characterized by a downward rigidity and prices (and real wages) are sticky (OECD 1990;
Goerke 2000). At least in the short run, switching from employee to employer based income taxes in-
creases wage cost to the employer and, unless the firm can charge higher prices or pass the costs on to the
employee, will face a decline in profits (Rutkowski and Walewski 2007; Daveri and Tabellini 2000). In
case of a “real wage resistance,” a shift in personal income taxes or social security contributions induces
a change in wage costs and taxes are (mainly or partly) borne by the firm, depending on the elasticity of
labor supply. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) used data for continental European countries, to provide some
evidence of wage resistance and found that a 10 percentage point increase in the tax wedge raises real la-
bor costs by 5 %. Kugler and Kugler (2009) used a panel of manufacturing plants from Colombia over the
1980s and 1990s and showed that wages fell only by 1.4 to 2.3 % in response to a 10 % rise in payroll taxes
due to downward wage rigidities and an elastic labor supply in the Colombian labor market. Furthermore,
as pointed out by Alesina and Perotti (1994), changes in the tax burden that induce a change in real labor
costs can change domestic production costs vis-à-vis those of foreign competitors, and hence, indirectly
influence labor demand. Thus, an increase in employer social security contributions can diminish a coun-
try’s international competitiveness acting like a real exchange rate appreciation (Arpaia and Carone 2004).
All of the just-mentioned arguments suggest a stronger effect of payroll taxes relative to labor income taxes
on the location of firms.
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Note: The graph is based on a Poisson regression including as explanatory variables all controls of the
conditional logit regression as explained in Sect. 3. The data on the number of headquarters comes from
Compustat whereas the effective average labor income taxes are based on own calculations (see the de-
scription in Sect. 2).
Fig. 1 Predicted number of headquarters vs. average labor income tax
2002). High-skilled workers perform more complex tasks where outcome may be
more risky and effort less observable than for more standardized low-skill-intensive
activities. This suggests that the effort of high-skilled individuals may be more sen-
sitive with respect to labor taxation than that of low-skilled workers. In addition,
since high-skilled individuals tend to be more mobile across borders than low-skilled
workers, labor taxation and the progressivity of a tax system will have a stronger neg-
ative effect on the availability of these individuals. Hence, the level of social security
contributions and the level of income tax rates, as well as their progressivity should
be important for a country’s attractiveness as headquarters’ location. The relation-
ship between the number of headquarters and the labor income tax for an individual
earning the average wage is depicted in Fig. 1. Accordingly, the figure shows that
the predicted number of headquarters ceteris paribus declines with a higher labor in-
come tax. The present paper assesses these previously mentioned hypotheses in the
following way.
We construct a unique panel data set on average and marginal effective labor in-
come taxes (including employee- and employer-borne social security contributions,
tax credits, and tax allowances and deductions) for 120 economies. We exploit the
cross-sectional dimension of this data-set by considering all location decisions or
relocating and new (first) location. We match this data-set onto the universe of cor-
responding cross-sectional data on 37,502 firms from Compustat. This leads to a
common data set of 79 countries and 35,206 firms, which can be used for the em-
pirical analysis. Alternatively, we exploit information on new (first) locations and on
relocations.
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The empirical results suggest that—conditional on other factors of influence such
as profit taxes—the probability of a country to be chosen as the headquarters location
depends negatively on the average level and progressivity of a country’s income tax
rate, as well as on the extent of social security contributions paid by firms and em-
ployees, respectively. The results are most pronounced for employer-borne payroll
taxes among all components of effective labor income taxes. On average, for new
(first or re-) locations a one percentage point increase in a country’s labor income tax
rate reduces the probability of it to attract the headquarters of the average firm by
6.1 % versus 6.8 % for a one percentage point increase in employer social security
contributions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present
the data, in particular, on effective labor income tax rates. Section 3 introduces the
econometric approach used for the empirical analysis—conditional logit and nested
logit models. Section 4 summarizes the empirical results and the results of a series of
robustness checks, and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 Data
In general, we use averaged data for explanatory variables for the period 2005–2009
or for 1992–2009, when considering new (first) and relocations. The dependent vari-
able is a binary location choice indicator, which denotes either the location state as
of 2009, for 35,206 companies, the relocations between 1992 and 2009 for 610 com-
panies, or the first location as well as relocation decisions for 4,335 firms.
2.1 Data on headquarters location
Information on the location of firms’ headquarters is available from Compustat. That
data set provides the residence country of the headquarters (as opposed to the country
of incorporation) of global firms, covered by stock indices. For each company, this
allows us to determine the J -nomial variable Loc and the binary variable Locij , where
the latter is unity whenever, for firm i with i = 1, . . . , I , Loc = j with j = 1, . . . , J
in 2009. Similarly, we can determine relocations between 1992 and 2009. Following
the direction of Pastor and Veronesi (2003), Fama and French (2004), or Chun et al.
(2008), we obtain our sample of first locating firms, by matching the date of the initial
public offering of our firms to the time in which they first appear in our data set. If the
IPO date6 occurred in the same (or later) year, we consider it a first locating firm.7
2.2 Data on income taxation
One contribution of this paper is the construction of a unique panel data set on ef-
fective labor income taxes for 120 countries annually for the years 1992–2009. We
6This information is only available for the North American data set.
7Notice that, with relocations or new locations, exploiting a short time period may be problematic for
reasons of few events, especially, if the focus is on headquarters and large firms.
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follow the methodology of the “Taxing Wages” approach used by the OECD, dis-
cussed by Head and Mayer (2004) and described in Egger and Radulescu (2011), to
compute marginal and average effective tax rates plus the social security contribu-
tions for an individual earning the average wage or five times the average wage of an
economy. Beyond social security contributions, we account for detailed provisions of
the respective national tax codes such as personal tax allowances, tax credits, standard
deductions, other country-specific formulae, and local (subnational) taxes.8 This data
set allows us to consider the importance of the progressivity of a country’s income
tax schedule beyond the one of average tax rates. The latter appears of particular im-
portance when considering the role of income taxation for high-skilled (and hence,
high-income) earners, as opposed to average workers and employees.
This comprehensive data set on income taxation was assembled from numerous
sources such as individual countries’ tax law, publications from international or-
ganizations, and data from international accounting firms. Among the most impor-
tant sources, beyond individual countries’ sources, we should mention the OECD
(1990–2009) Taxing Wages data sets for several years, PricewaterhouseCoopers’
(1997–2005) Individual Taxes: Worldwide Summaries and PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers Worldwide Tax Summaries for various years, PKF International’s (2007–2010)
Worldwide Tax Guide, the legal database provided by the Global legal information
network (1980–2012), the Social Security Observatory’s (2002–2010) Social Secu-
rity Programs Throughout the World for social security legislation, and the Inter-
national Labor Organization’s (ILO) LABORSTA database for data on annual gross
wages.
Based on the aforementioned data sources, we define the following variables cap-
turing aspects of the income taxation of country j : LabTaxj denotes the labor income
tax burden on an individual earning the average wage; Prog500j indicates the pro-
gression of a country’s tax schedule defined as the log of one minus the difference
between the marginal taxes of an individual earning five times the average wage and
the marginal tax of an individual earning the average wage; EmployeeSocSecj and
EmployerSocSecj represent employee- and employer-borne social security contribu-
tions, respectively. LabTax500j indicates the labor income tax burden for an individ-
ual earning five times of the average wage.9
To compute the above and the corresponding marginal income tax rates, we used
information on average gross wages per employee in US dollars, Wagej , from the
ILO’s LABORSTA database. For consistency’s sake, we used annual sectoral wages
by level of employment to create an average annual wage where possible.
2.3 Data on control variables
Several control variables for headquarters location beyond income tax variables were
based on source data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the
8Peter et al. (2010) compute the tax liability for pretax incomes equivalent to one, two, three and four times
a country’s GDP per capita. However, we assume gross wages to be better reflective of the actual income
tax base. Also, Peter et al. (2010) do not account for social security contributions and other provisions,
which we consider as important for inference of the effective tax burden on labor.
9A considerable number of countries have labor income, social security, and corporate income tax rates of
zero.
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United Nations’ Statistics Division. In particular, we used the following variables
and data in all regressions: statutory corporate tax rates across potential locations
(CorpTaxj ) as a fraction of unity, measuring the intensity of profit taxation; gross
domestic product in US dollars as a measure of j ’s market size (GDPj ); a country’s
capital stock in US dollars (CapStockj ) as a measure of capital abundance (given mar-
ket size);10 and on average wages per employee in US dollars (Wagej ) as a measure
of wage costs in j net of labor taxes. While data on the latter variable come from the
ILO LABORSTA database, the ones underlying CorpTaxj , GDPj , and CapStockj
are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Moreover, in some re-
gressions we use the share of the population with tertiary education in country j
(TertEduj ) based on data from Lutz (2007) to measure skill abundance,11 and the
number of flights to and from country j as a measure of infrastructure abundance
to construct the following variables (Flightsj ) from World Development Indicators.
To include a measure of the institutional strength of a country, we employ an indica-
tor (LegalRightsj ), which is unity if the country’s legal rights index, as reported in
the World Development Indicators, is above the world-wide median.12 All remain-
ing variables are used in a log-transformed way. In particular, all income and profit
tax measures are log-transformed after subtracting the respective fraction from unity
(since some of those measures are zero). Hence, the respective variables measure a
country’s attractiveness in (income and profit) tax terms. All level variables enter the
regressions simply in a log-transformed way, except for TertEduj which is the log of
the tertiary education share plus unity.
2.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the data for 79 countries and 35,206 firms for
which all the necessary information is available and which can subsequently be used
for the empirical analysis.
Table 1 suggests that the mean of the labor tax burden on an individual earning
the average wage is 10.3 % and the maximum is 36.3 % for the average country
10We follow Griliches (1980) to use the perpetual inventory method for calculating country-specific capital
stocks. The capital stock of country j in year t is
Kjt = Kjt−1(1 − δ) + Ijt , (1)
where Ijt is real investment (gross fixed capital formation in constant US dollars of the year 2000) in
country j and year t and δ denotes the depreciation rate, which we assume to be 10 %. The capital stock
Kj0 in the first period of the sample is computed as
Kj0 =
Ij0
(g¯j + δ) , (2)
where g¯j represents the average annual investment growth rate over the whole time span and Ij0 denotes
investment in the first year where data are available. We then calculate the average value of Kjt for the
relevant time span (2005–2009 or 1992–2009).
11We argue that strong progressivity of the income tax system may distort the education decision of in-
dividuals. To that end, the tertiary education measure may reflect in part an income tax effect. However,
income taxation should also induce an impact on effort beyond education.
12The worldwide median for the WDI’s Strength of Legal Rights Index is 6 out of a possible 10.
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Table 1 Summary statistics for stock of firms: 2005–2009
Mean Stddev Median Max Min Nb-obs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LabTax 0.103 0.071 0.108 0.363 0.000 35,206
Prog500 0.155 0.071 0.143 0.432 0.000 35,206
EmployerSocSec 0.110 0.065 0.095 0.372 0.000 35,206
EmployeeSocSec 0.075 0.048 0.071 0.300 0.000 35,206
CorpTax 0.324 0.067 0.331 0.411 0.000 35,206
GDP, mn. US$ 3,884,000 4,688,000 2,470,000 13,720,000 3,418 35,206
CapStock, mn. US$ 5,283,000 5,862,000 2,640,000 16,410,000 8,060 35,206
TertEdu 0.589 0.131 0.588 0.858 0.167 35,206
Wage 34,386 18,103 40,135 66,851 20 35,206
Table 2 Summary statistics for relocating & first locating firms: 1992–2009
Mean Stddev Median Max Min Nb-obs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LabTax 0.148 0.053 0.170 0.400 0.000 4,335
Prog500 0.104 0.040 0.092 0.365 0.000 4,335
EmployerSocSec 0.094 0.045 0.079 0.282 0.000 4,335
EmployeeSocSec 0.072 0.026 0.070 0.258 0.000 4,335
CorpTax 0.377 0.052 0.393 0.456 0.000 4,335
GDP, mn. US$ 7,582,000 3,979,000 10,150,000 10,150,000 5,016 4,335
CapStock, mn. US$ 9,061,000 4,420,000 11,750,000 11,750,000 6,281 4,335
TertEdu 0.679 0.089 0.725 0.868 0.233 4,335
Wage 35,630 10,760 40,020 70,343 635 4,335
and year between 2005 and 2009. The average rate of progressivity is 15.5 % and
has a maximum value of 43.2 % in that period. The average values of employer-
borne and employee-borne social security contributions amount to 11 % and 7.5 %,
respectively, with maximum values of 37.2 % and 30 %, respectively. Table 1 also
reports summary statistics on corporate taxes, which range from a minimum value of
0 % to a maximum of 41.1 % with an average value of 32.4 %. The lowest average
annual wage income amounts to 20 US dollars recorded in Zimbabwe and the highest
one to 66,851 US dollars recorded in Switzerland.
In Table 2, we present the same summary statistics but this time for a smaller
sample of 50 countries and 4,335 firms including only the relocated and first locat-
ing firms. The mean for the labor tax burden for an individual earning the average
wage amounts to 14.8 %, with a maximum of 40 % for the average country between
1992 and 2009. Progressivity amounts to slightly more than 10 %, with a maximum
of 36.5 %. Social security contributions remained roughly on par with the sample
for 2005–2009. Corporate taxes now range from 0 % to 45.6 % with an average of
37.7 %.
Effective labor taxation and the international location of headquarters 639
Fig. 2 Conditional logit choice
structure
3 Empirical strategy
This section introduces the empirical specifications used to identify whether and to
which extent labor taxes, social security contributions, and the progressivity of a tax
system ceteris paribus play a role in a firm’s decision about where to locate its head-
quarters.
3.1 Conditional logit
To estimate location choice behavior, one model is the conditional logit model (Mc-
Fadden 1974), as illustrated in Fig. 2. This model is suitable to address the question
of how a country’s characteristics, such as the effective taxes on labor income, affect
a country’s likelihood of being chosen as a firm’s headquarters location.
As explained in Sect. 2.1, we denote the binary dependent variable by Locij . It is
unity if firm i = 1, . . . , I has its headquarters in country j = 1, . . . , J in 2009 and
zero otherwise. Alternatively, it is unity if firm i relocates or locates for the first time
its headquarters in j between 1992 and 2009, and zero otherwise. To determine the
probability that country j is chosen as the location of firm i’s headquarters, we first
define the deterministic net return that would be derived from locating in country j
as
Vij = V (Locij = 1|xj ) = βx′j , (3)
where xj denotes a vector of alternative-specific variables facing the headquarters of
firm i in country j , such as LabTaxj , Prog500j , EmployeeSocSecj , EmployerSocSecj ,
CorpTaxj , GDPj , CapStockj , Wagej , TertEduj , Flightsj , and LegalRightsj .
The conditional probability of headquarters location for firm i in country j is first
estimated using the following conditional logit regression model13
Pr(Locij = 1|xj ) = e
Vij
∑J
l=1 eVil
= e
βx′j
∑J
l=1 eβx
′
l
, ∀l = 1, . . . , J : j = l. (4)
As is well known, β can be estimated consistently if the following assumptions
hold: First, error terms associated with the stochastic version of (3) must be identi-
cally and independently distributed, and second, the independence of irrelevant alter-
natives (IIA) criterion must be met. If the IIA assumption is violated, including some
13Notice that the conditional logit model is also dubbed the conditional fixed effect logit model as it
captures by construction all characteristics that are invariant across locations and specific to the individual
or firm making location choices (see Allison 2009; Greene 2002). Since a firm’s main industry is a (fairly)
time-invariant characteristic, the approach implicitly also controls for product characteristics. However,
this is not the case with regional-specific effects, which vary across nests of locations j . The latter may be
accounted for in a nested logit model using, e.g., continental clustering.
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Fig. 3 Nested logit choice structure
previously omitted location could alter the probability at which similar countries are
chosen. For example, exclusion of Canada from the list of alternative countries could
increase the probability that firms locate in the United States. Similarly, Germany and
France could have correlated error terms, both being in Europe. Such correlation is
ruled out under IIA; therefore, the conditional logit model runs the risk to produce
biased estimates of the effects of taxes on the location decision.
3.2 Nested logit
To overcome the potential bias of the conditional logit model following from a vi-
olation of the IIA assumption, we employ the nested logit model as an alternative
econometric approach, because it relaxes the IIA criterion by employing a hierar-
chical choice structure. In the nested logit model, we group countries by per-capita
income (low, middle-low, middle-high, and high) following the World Bank’s cate-
gorization with the first two groups combined into one so as to achieve a more even
distribution of countries into nests.14 The decision to locate in country j is split into
first the choice of the nest of countries j belongs in, N(j), which is determined by
nest-specific characteristics that do not vary within the nest, and, subsequently, the
choice among the countries within the nest, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
The deterministic net return of firm i from locating its headquarters in country j
is then specified as
Vij = V (Locij = 1|xj ,wn) = βx′j + δnw′n, (5)
14Of the 79 countries in our sample, 37 fall into the high-income category, 25 into the middle-high in-
come class, 17 middle-low to low-income countries. The exact definition is as follows. High-income
countries: Austria, Australia, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
Middle-to-high-income countries: Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia,
Namibia, Panama, Peru, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey. Low-income countries:
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay,
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. From here on, we will refer to the
middle-to-high-income category as the middle-income category.
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where xj is a vector of alternative-specific variables firm i faces in country j ,
and wn denotes a vector of nest-specific variables determining the choice of nest
N(j).15
The probability of locating in country j can be split into the product of the condi-
tional probability of locating in country j if it belongs in nest N(j)—term (a)—and
the probability of j being in nest N(j)—term (b):
Pr(Locij = 1|xj ) = Pr
(
Locij = 1|xj ∈ N(j)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
×Pr(j ∈ N(j))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
. (6)
Starting with term (a), we can describe the conditional probability of belonging in
nest N(j) as
Pr
(
Locij = 1|xj ∈ N(j)
) = e
Vij
τN(j)
∑
l∈N(j) eIVN(j)
, ∀j = l ∈ N(j) (7)
where
IVN(j) = ln
∑
l∈N(j)
e
Vij
τN(j) . (8)
The random net return maximization model adopted here imposes the least restric-
tions on the structure of the nested logit model and allows us to compare countries
even across nests rather than only within a nest. In that model, the dissimilarity pa-
rameter, τN(j), is a measure of the uniqueness of the country-alternatives within nest
N(j) and is defined as
τN(j) =
√
1 − ρN(j), (9)
where ρN(j) denotes the correlation coefficient among the error terms within nest
N(j). If the correlation among countries within a nest is positive, then τN(j) will be
within the unit interval.16
Term (b) in Eq. (6) represents the conditional probability of choosing country j in
nest N(j) and can be expressed as
Pr
(
j ∈ N(j)) = e
τN(j)IVN(j)
∑
k∈N(k) eτN(k)IVN(k)
, ∀N(j) = N(k) (10)
15In the generalized version, we set up the nested logit model such that the alternative-specific variables
have a nonalternative-specific coefficient, while the nest-specific variables have nest-specific coefficients.
We do this since alternative-specific variables will have an equal influence on firms, while the other vari-
ables are indeed nest-specific.
16It is possible that the correlation of countries within a nest is negative, resulting in a |τN(j)| > 1.
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By multiplying the two probabilities defined in Eqs. (7) and (10), we obtain the prob-
ability of choosing country j as the headquarters location:
Pr(Locij = 1|xj ) = e
Vij
τN(j)
∑
l∈N(j) e
Vil
τN(j)
× e
τN(j)IVN(j)
∑
k∈N(k) eτN(k)IVN(k)
,
∀j = l ∈ N(j), N(j) = N(k). (11)
By obtaining estimates for the Vij in the nested logit model, we can evaluate
the probability of choosing country j as a location of headquarters as well as semi-
elasticities of tax parameters.
4 Estimation results
We hypothesize ceteris paribus a negative effect of our variables of interest—namely
the ones involving LabTaxj , Prog500j , EmployeeSocSecj , and EmployerSocSecj —
on a country’s attractiveness as a potential headquarters location. Higher labor income
taxes, higher employee-borne social security contributions and a more progressive
tax system exert a negative effect on effort of high-income earners, such as man-
agers and engineers, whereas higher employer-borne social security contributions
represent higher direct labor costs for firms such that all four variables negatively
affect expected profits, directly or indirectly. The effects of these variables of interest
are estimated conditionally on a number of aforementioned control variables involv-
ing CorpTaxj , GDPj , CapStockj , Wagej , TertEduj , LegalRightsj , and Flightsj , and
three interaction terms, Wagej ×TertEduj , CapStockj ×GDPj , and Wagej ×GDPj .
These control variables account for determinants of headquarters location choice be-
yond labor taxes.
We rationalize the effects of these additional controls in the following way. Higher
corporate taxes, CorpTaxj , and higher average gross wages, Wagej , should reduce a
country’s attractiveness as a potential location for headquarters since they both re-
duce profits ceteris paribus.17 In line with previous theoretical research, we expect
that a higher GDPj , as a measure of market size, positively influences the inclination
of firms to locate in a particular country, the same goes for a bigger capital stock
CapStockj , which, given country size, is a proxy for the availability of capital in
a country. Finally, a more educated population, TertEduj , greater institutional qual-
ity, LegalRightsj , as well as a better traffic and airport infrastructure, Flightsj , for
a given country size, should also increase a country’s attractiveness as a potential
host for headquarters at given country size. The interaction terms Wagej × TertEduj ,
Wagej × GDPj , and CapStockj × GDPj control for a possibly lesser importance
of wage costs in skill-abundant and large markets on the one hand and of market
17Given that the conditional logit model implicitly controls for company specific effects such as produc-
tivity, wage cost differences reflect production costs rather than productivity levels, such that we can safely
assume a negative effect on profits.
Effective labor taxation and the international location of headquarters 643
Table 3 Conditional logit results for country choice
Model Model Model
(1) (2) (3)
ln(1 − LabTax) 1.730*** 1.523*** 0.263
0.109 0.153 0.167
ln(1 − Prog500) 0.598*** 0.800*** 1.205***
0.089 0.098 0.103
ln(1 − EmployerSocSec) 5.202*** 4.862*** 5.116***
0.077 0.097 0.099
ln(1 − EmployeeSocSec) 1.943*** 2.027*** −0.159
0.143 0.150 0.170
ln(1 − CorpTax) 1.413*** 0.740*** 0.923***
0.076 0.124 0.125
ln(GDP) 1.211*** 1.465*** 1.195***
0.066 0.081 0.082
ln(CapStock) 2.948*** 2.486*** 3.984***
0.080 0.092 0.116
ln(Wage) −0.004 0.148 −0.464***
0.127 0.138 0.141
ln(TertEdu) 3.418*** 5.296***
0.215 0.225
LegalRights 0.591*** 0.751***
0.021 0.022
ln(Flights) 0.304***
0.014
ln(Wage × TertEdu) −0.385*** −0.604***
0.022 0.024
ln(CapStock × GDP) −0.062*** −0.055*** −0.084***
0.005 0.003 0.003
ln(Wage × GDP) 0.009* 0.010* 0.003
0.003 0.005 0.005
Cases 35,840 35,206 34,302
LR 90,832.95*** 79,903.83*** 77,758.29***
Pseudo-R2 0.2763 0.2602 0.2647
Notes: Choice of country using the conditional logit model. Standard errors are reported beneath the coef-
ficients. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 %, respectively.
size and capital-abundance (as a measure of development) on the other hand. Since
LabTaxj , Prog500j , EmployeeSocSecj , EmployerSocSecj , and CorpTaxj are used in
log-transformed variables, the log of one minus the respective variable in our regres-
sions, positive coefficients for the first five dependent variables reported in Tables 3,
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4, and 6 actually reflect a negative impact of the underlying tax components on loca-
tion choice, as seen by the negative semi-elasticities.
4.1 Conditional logit estimates
Table 3 presents the regression results for three alternative conditional logit specifi-
cations. The three specifications differ with respect to the control variables included.
The coefficients of the main variables of interest, namely the ones involving LabTaxj ,
Prog500j , EmployeeSocSecj , and EmployerSocSecj , are positive (i.e., the impact of
the underlying tax instruments is negative) and highly significant in Models (1) and
(2), while LabTaxj and EmployeeSocSecj are not significantly different from zero in
Model (3).
Headquarters location choice obviously depends on other factors beyond labor
taxes. Capital abundance and market size display a positive effect on the decision to
locate in a particular country, as expected. In Models (2) and (3), we also account
for the influence of the population with tertiary education. The coefficient of interest
is positive and highly significant. Moreover, a better airport infrastructure, as cap-
tured by the number of international flights, increases the probability of choosing
a particular host country. The interaction terms of wages with GDPj and TertEduj
are significantly different from zero while the main effect of wages is not. Many of
the estimated parameters are significant at 1 %. We consider Model (2) as a reason-
ably parsimonious benchmark specification and consider modifications of it in what
follows.
One particular concern with the results in Table 3 might be that there is enormous
heterogeneity about the timing of location choice in the sample of firms at hand. In
other words, it would be desirable to focus on new locations in comparison to all
locations. We pursue such an approach in two ways. First, we consider relocations
of headquarters in the time window 1992–2009. A relocation is identified by a firm
identifier and a change in the country of location (domicile) of a headquarters. In
the data, there are 610 relocations between 1992 and 2009. Alternatively, we may
consider new locations in general, defined as relocations and first locations (through
new incorporations). We do so by considering first locations and relocations between
1992 and 2009 in the data. Altogether, this obtains 4,335 new locations (first locations
plus relocations). The corresponding parameter estimates are summarized in Table 4.
For convenience, Table 4 repeats the estimates for Model (2) from Table 3 in the
first column. The parameters suggest that the results qualitatively support the conclu-
sions drawn from Table 3, except for employee-borne social security contributions.
However, we should be aware of the drastically smaller number of observations when
considering location changes relative to the stock of locations in Table 3.
Since the models in Tables 3 and 4 are nonlinear, we cannot infer anything from
the coefficient estimates about the relative importance of tax instruments in affecting
location choice within and across the estimated models. To assess the relative im-
portance of the variables of interest, we calculate semi-elasticities by raising one tax
instrument’s level by one percentage point (i.e., by 0.01) and assessing the change in
the average probability of a country being chosen as the location in response to the
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Table 4 Baseline regression results: conditional logit model
Stock of firms Relocating firms Relocating & new firms
ln(1 − LabTax) 1.523*** 7.793*** 5.721***
0.153 1.426 0.771
ln(1 − Prog500) 0.800*** 6.209*** 5.815***
0.098 1.180 0.575
ln(1 − EmployerSocSec) 4.862*** 11.306*** 6.129***
0.097 1.415 0.724
ln(1 − EmployeeSocSec) 2.027*** −3.454* −2.139**
0.150 1.895 1.047
ln(1 − CorpTax) 0.740*** 2.031** 2.118***
0.124 0.856 0.542
ln(GDP) 1.465*** 9.177*** 2.601***
0.081 1.114 0.492
ln(CapStock) 2.486*** −2.034*** −3.588***
0.092 0.711 0.390
ln(Wage) 0.148 11.750*** 7.269***
0.138 1.600 0.877
ln(TertEdu) 3.418*** 55.079*** 18.403***
0.215 7.094 3.627
LegalRights 0.591*** 1.396*** 0.765***
0.021 0.263 0.136
ln(Wage × TertEdu) −0.385*** −4.967*** −1.576***
0.022 0.706 0.361
ln(CapStock × GDP) −0.055*** −0.045* 0.087***
0.003 0.026 0.013
ln(Wage × GDP) 0.010* −0.369*** −0.245***
0.005 0.054 0.031
Cases 35,206 610 4,335
Log-likelihood −113,582.97 −1,562.26 −6,518.17
LR 79,903.88*** 1,648.15*** 20,893.86***
Pseudo-R2 0.2602 0.3453 0.6158
Notes: Representation of conditional logit results for the baseline Model (2) in Table 3. Standard errors
are reported beneath the coefficients. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and
10 %, respectively.
rise per tax instrument. The semi-elasticities corresponding to the models in Table 4
(which includes the benchmark Model (2) from Table 3) are summarized in Table 5.18
18To calculate the semi-elasticity of a log-transformed tax variable t , we raise t by one percentage point,
i.e., by 0.01. In the model, this changes ln(1 − t) to ln(1 − t − 0.01). Then, evaluated at the average, we
consider the change in the probability of the average country to be chosen as a headquarters location in
percent.
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Table 5 Baseline semi-elasticities—conditional logit
LabTax Prog500 EmployerSocSec EmployeeSocSec CorpTax
Stock of firms −0.017∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
Relocating firms −0.082∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ 0.038∗ −0.029∗∗
Relocating & new firms −0.061∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
Notes: The average semi-elasticities refer to Table 4. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical signifi-
cance at 1, 5, and 10 %, respectively.
One-hundred times an entry in Table 5 indicates the percentage change in the av-
erage country’s probability of being chosen as a headquarters location in response to
a one-percentage point increase in a respective tax instrument at a time. The results
suggest that a one-percentage point increase in the employer-borne social security
contributions exhibits the relatively biggest effect among the instruments considered.
In most specifications, this is followed by the wage tax rate. The relatively lowest
results are recorded for corporate income taxes. We argue that this result can be as-
cribed to the possibility of corporate profit shifting to low tax locations. In compari-
son, the income tax base (wage bill) cannot be as easily manipulated as the profit tax
base, which leads to relatively bigger effects of labor income taxes and social security
contributions on the location choice than of profit taxes.
4.2 Nested logit estimates
For the reasons explained in Sect. 3.2, it may be worthwhile to consider a nested
logit model as an alternative econometric approach towards headquarters location
choice. Table 6 reports the results for a nested logit model based on the specifi-
cation of Model (2) in Table 3 and using different nesting approaches. We use the
nest-averaged log of GDP per capita for each nest as the nest-specific variable, wn,
in terms of Eq. (5). As in the conditional logit specification, the coefficients on
the main variables of interest, namely LabTaxj , Prog500j , EmployeeSocSecj , and
EmployerSocSecj are all positive and highly significant in the model with income
nesting.
As alternatives to income nesting, we employ three different types of nesting based
on geographical variables. In the second column of Table 6, we group countries into
continental groups: the Americas (comprised of countries in North America, Latin
America, and the Caribbean), Europe (comprised of European countries, including
Russia), and the Rest of the World (comprising all remaining countries in Africa,
Asia, and Oceania). As before, the coefficients on all main variables of interest are
positive and highly significant, while the corporate tax variable is insignificant.19
19These results are in line with Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) who also find low elasticities for the
corporate tax. In their study, corporate tax levels are insignificant in a region-nested model but have a
significant impact on the headquarters location choice in a population-nested model. In their population-
nested specifications, a one percentage point rise in the corporate tax rate reduces the probability of a state
as a headquarters location by 2.25 %. As Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) also note, these lower elasticities
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Table 6 Baseline regression results: nested logit models
Income nested Region nested Distance nested Distance nested
(alternative)
ln(1 − LabTax) 3.849∗∗∗ 1.913∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗
0.770 0.322 0.250 0.194
ln(1 − Prog500) 2.368∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
0.477 0.179 0.144 0.124
ln(1 − EmployerSocSec) 6.461∗∗∗ 3.916∗∗∗ 4.074∗∗∗ 2.776∗∗∗
1.245 0.569 0.571 0.505
ln(1 − EmployeeSocSec) 1.687∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗ 2.149∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗
0.383 0.256 0.336 0.243
ln(1 − CorpTax) 0.781∗∗∗ 0.064 0.884∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗
0.229 0.147 0.202 0.156
ln(GDP) 0.229 1.805∗∗∗ 1.484∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
0.144 0.275 0.223 0.166
ln(CapStock) 4.221∗∗∗ 1.365∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗
0.820 0.230 0.190 0.240
ln(Wage) −3.379∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
0.701 0.200 0.200 0.135
ln(TertEdu) 4.571∗∗∗ 2.042∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗∗
0.917 0.378 0.283 0.267
LegalRightsDummy 0.709∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗
0.139 0.075 0.120 0.078
ln(Wage × TertEdu) −0.477∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗
0.096 0.040 0.033 0.031
ln(CapStock × GDP) −0.086∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
0.017 0.006 0.005 0.005
ln(Wage × GDP) 0.137∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
0.028 0.007 0.007 0.005
Cases 35,206 35,206 35,206 35,206
Log-likelihood −113,308.44 −112,375.74 −112,785.34 113,071.27
LR test for IIA 269.42∗∗∗ 640.80∗∗∗ 281.92∗∗∗ 814.02∗∗∗
IIA passed? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Representation of nested logit results for baseline Model (2) as in Table 3. Standard errors are
reported beneath the coefficients. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and
10 %, respectively.
As two further alternatives to income nesting, we group countries according to
their average distance to the rest of the world in two ways. The first distance-based
compared to other studies can also be explained by the fact that these studies focus on manufacturing firms
which creates an upward bias in the corporate tax effect whereas Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) and we
use data on headquarters in all economic sectors.
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Table 7 Baseline semi-elasticities—nested logit
LabTax Prog500 EmployerSocSec EmployeeSocSec CorpTax
Income
nested
Mean −0.036∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
High-income −0.028 −0.018 −0.049 −0.012 −0.007
Middle-income −0.044 −0.029 −0.080 −0.020 −0.012
Low-income −0.044 −0.027 −0.072 −0.018 −0.012
Region
nested
Mean −0.022∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.001
Americas −0.020 −0.012 −0.046 −0.016 −0.001
Europe −0.026 −0.015 −0.057 −0.020 −0.001
ROW −0.018 −0.010 −0.036 −0.013 −0.001
Distance
nested
Mean −0.011∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
Near −0.013 −0.008 −0.053 −0.025 −0.013
Middle −0.011 −0.007 −0.041 −0.021 −0.012
Far −0.009 −0.006 −0.038 −0.019 −0.010
Distance
nested
(alterna-
tive)
Mean −0.014∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
Near −0.016 −0.011 −0.055 −0.022 −0.015
Middle −0.011 −0.008 −0.035 −0.014 −0.011
Far −0.012 −0.008 −0.038 −0.017 −0.012
Notes: The average semi-elasticities refer to Table 6. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical signifi-
cance at 1, 5, and 10 %, respectively.
nesting summarized in the third column of Table 6 groups countries with an average
distance of less than 7,000 km into the category Near, an average distance to the rest
of the world between 7,000 km and 9,000 km into the category Middle, and all re-
maining countries into the category Far. The second distance-based nesting summa-
rized in the fourth column of Table 6 (denoted Alternative), draws those boundaries
at 8,000 km and 10,000 km, respectively.20 Also with distance-based nesting, the co-
efficients of the variables of interest, namely the ones involving LabTaxj , Prog500j ,
EmployerSocSecj , and EmployeeSocSecj , are positive and highly significant.
Table 7 summarizes the semi-elasticities of location choice with respect to tax
instruments corresponding to the parameter estimates in Table 6. The magnitudes of
those semi-elasticities are generally comparable to the ones based on the conditional
logit models in Table 5.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis and further results
In the sensitivity analysis, we focus on conditional logit models since they are compa-
rable regarding the semi-elasticities and much less demanding in terms of likelihood
optimization. Since the semi-elasticities are more meaningful than mere parameter
estimates, we focus on a presentation of those.
20The average distance to the rest of the world ranges from a little more than 6,500 km for Bulgaria to
over 13,000 km for New Zealand.
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We summarize the sensitivity analysis in Table 8. The table is organized hori-
zontally in three blocks and vertically in two blocks. Horizontally, we distinguish
between samples of all firms 35,206 firms in 2005–2009 and their location choice
independent of the time (Stock of Firms; far left), of all 610 firms relocating between
1992 and 2009 (Relocating Firms; in the center), and of all 4,335 first-locating or
relocating firms between 1992 and 2009 (Relocating & New Firms; far right).
Vertically, we report on three robustness checks using subsamples in the upper
part of the table and on the use of one alternative tax instrument in the last row of
Table 8. In two robustness checks presented in the first two lines of Table 8, we
restrict the sample to high-skilled and low-skilled intensive firms, respectively. Such
firms are identified by a ratio of expenditures on research and development and sales
which is higher than the median and low-skilled intensive firms by a ratio which is
at most as high as the median. In a third experiment, we focus on a sample, which
excludes holding companies. The Compustat North American database—which is
a sub-set of the data used here—includes data on so-called American Depositary
Receipt (ADR) companies, which are basically US holding companies. We are able
to use this information to exclude these companies.
In the fourth row of Table 8, which represents an experiment involving an alter-
native tax instrument, we replace the tax progressivity measure, Prog500j , by the
labor tax rate on five times the average wage in a country, LabTax500j . The findings
suggest that the qualitative insights from earlier tables are unchanged. In particular,
employer-borne social security contributions are relatively important among the con-
sidered instruments, and several labor tax instruments exhibit higher semi-elasticities
as corporate taxes do for headquarters location. The tax rate for five times the aver-
age wage, LabTax500j , exhibits a significant negative impact on top of the income
tax rate for the average wage. This is consistent with the results involving tax pro-
gressivity in Model (2) of Table 3.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence on the impact of different components of effective la-
bor taxes on the international location decision of firms’ headquarters using data on
35,026 firms’ headquarters and 79 countries. We compile a unique data set on ef-
fective labor income taxes comprising besides labor taxes also both employee-borne
and employer-borne social security contributions as well as further country specific
regulations. We merge these tax data with data from Compustat that provide infor-
mation on the location of firms’ headquarters and data from WDI on country specific
characteristics. The richness of our tax data and the large number of firm headquar-
ters observations as well as the econometric specifications employed allow a more
precise identification of the impact of effective labor taxes on firms headquarters’
location than aggregate data would.
Overall, our findings suggest that the progressivity of a country’s tax schedule, the
social security contributions levied and the level of the labor income tax affect the
conditional probability of firms’ headquarters location choice. The results are most
pronounced for employer-borne payroll taxes. Hence, a one percentage point increase
650 P. Egger et al.
Ta
bl
e
8
Co
nd
iti
on
al
lo
gi
ts
em
i-e
la
sti
ci
tie
s:
se
n
sit
iv
ity
ex
pe
rim
en
ts
Co
nd
iti
on
al
lo
gi
t:
st
oc
k
o
ffi
rm
s
Co
n
di
tio
na
ll
o
gi
t:
re
lo
ca
tin
g
fir
m
s
Co
n
di
tio
na
ll
o
gi
t:
re
lo
ca
tin
g
&
n
ew
fir
m
s
La
b
Ta
x
Pr
og
50
0
So
c
Se
c
ER
So
c
Se
c
EE
Co
rp
Ta
x
La
b
Ta
x
50
0
La
b
Ta
x
Pr
og
50
0
So
c
Se
c
ER
So
c
Se
c
EE
Co
rp
Ta
x
La
b
Ta
x
50
0
La
b
Ta
x
Pr
og
50
0
So
c
Se
c
ER
So
c
Se
c
EE
Co
rp
Ta
x
La
b
Ta
x
50
0
Su
bs
am
pl
es
o
ft
he
da
ta
H
ig
h
sk
ill
ed
−0
.0
07
*
*
*
−0
.0
01
−0
.0
55
*
*
*
−0
.0
38
*
*
*
−0
.0
16
*
*
*
−0
.0
65
*
*
*
−0
.0
59
*
*
*
−0
.1
46
*
*
*
0.
03
9
−0
.0
24
−0
.0
54
*
*
*
−0
.0
60
*
*
*
−0
.0
81
*
*
*
0.
02
2
−0
.0
25
*
*
*
Lo
w
sk
ill
ed
−0
.0
28
*
*
*
−0
.0
17
*
*
*
−0
.0
53
*
*
*
−0
.0
03
−0
.0
03
−0
.1
55
*
*
*
−0
.1
02
*
*
−0
.1
15
*
*
*
0.
02
9
−0
.0
21
*
*
*
−0
.0
84
*
*
*
−0
.0
71
*
*
*
−0
.0
40
*
*
*
0.
02
0
−0
.0
37
*
*
*
N
o
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
-
n
ie
s
−0
.0
16
*
*
*
−0
.0
09
*
*
*
−0
.0
55
*
*
*
−0
.0
22
*
*
*
−0
.0
10
*
*
*
−0
.0
83
*
*
*
−0
.0
68
*
*
*
−0
.1
39
*
*
*
0.
04
1
*
−0
.0
27
*
*
−0
.0
63
*
*
*
−0
.0
73
*
*
*
−0
.0
76
*
*
*
0.
03
2
*
−0
.0
24
*
*
*
A
lte
rn
at
iv
e
ta
x
in
str
um
en
t
N
o
pr
o-
gr
es
siv
ity
−0
.0
11
*
*
*
–
−0
.0
57
*
*
*
−0
.0
29
*
*
*
−0
.0
14
*
*
*
−0
.0
09
*
*
*
−0
.0
46
*
*
*
–
−0
.1
23
*
*
*
−0
.0
15
−0
.0
42
*
*
*
−0
.0
06
−0
.0
19
*
*
–
−0
.0
85
*
*
*
−0
.0
15
−0
.0
42
*
*
*
−0
.0
16
*
*
No
te
s:
Su
bs
am
pl
es
o
f
th
e
da
ta
in
cl
ud
e:
Fi
rm
s
o
pe
ra
tin
g
in
hi
gh
-s
ki
lle
d
(as
m
ea
su
re
d
by
se
ct
or
-
av
er
ag
ed
R
&
D
-to
-S
al
es
ra
tio
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
th
e
w
o
rld
-w
id
e
m
ed
ia
n);
fir
m
s
o
pe
ra
tin
g
in
lo
w
-
sk
ill
ed
se
ct
or
s
(se
ct
or
s
w
ith
be
lo
w
-m
ed
ia
n
R
&
D
-to
-S
al
es
ra
tio
s);
n
o
n
ho
ld
in
g
co
m
pa
ni
es
.T
he
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
ta
x
in
str
um
en
tr
ep
la
ce
s
Pr
o
gr
es
siv
ity
,
Pr
o
g5
00
,
w
ith
th
e
la
bo
ri
nc
om
e
ta
x
ra
te
fo
r
fiv
e
tim
es
th
e
av
er
ag
e
w
ag
e,
La
bT
a
x5
00
.
Th
e
sy
m
bo
ls
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
an
d
*
de
n
o
te
st
at
ist
ic
al
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
at
1,
5,
an
d
10
%
,
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
Effective labor taxation and the international location of headquarters 651
in a country’s labor income tax leads—on average—to a reduction in the probability
of a country as a potential location for headquarters by 1.7 % in the whole stock
of firms and by 6.1 % for relocating and new firms, and 8.2 for relocating firms
only. For employer social security contributions, the results are even larger and a one
percentage point increase reduces the probability of headquarters’ location by 5.5 %
in the whole sample of firms, by 6.8 % when we consider only relocating and new
firms, and by 12.2 % if we focus on relocating firms only. The results prove robust in
various empirical model specifications (such as using alternative nesting structures)
and subsets of the data (i.e., focusing on firms operating in high or low skilled sectors
only).
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